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1.  Introduction and overview 
 
The risks associated with premature liberalization and external integration of the financial sector 
in emerging markets have been known at least since the documentation of the Southern Cone experience 
by Diaz-Alejandro (1985).  However, the subprime mortgage crisis which began in 2006 in the U.S. and 
then morphed into the Great Recession of 2008-09 shows that financial systems even in the advanced 
economies are vulnerable.  Notably, evidence in Philippon (2008) shows that the U.S. crisis was 
preceded by a massive and unprecedented expansion of the financial sector between 2002 and 2007.  
Philippon does not find an explanation for this expansion based on the needs of the corporate sector, 
although as others have pointed out, this may be because of the rise of household borrowing in 
connection with subprime mortgage loans combined with moral hazard and excessive risk-taking.   
The point emerging from the above is that the financial sector must be assessed in terms of its 
impact on the growth of the real sector, which is where the social costs and benefits ultimately reside. 
For example, the authors of the 2010 Squam Lake Report (French et al. 2010) on fixing the U.S. 
financial sector note (p. 26) that “…effective financial regulations require that politicians, and 
ultimately, the public, have an adequate understanding of the financial system.  The political turmoil 
surrounding the Crisis suggests the importance of disseminating expert knowledge about finance to a 
broader audience …” The starting point of conveying such understanding in order to gain support for 
regulatory reform must be an analysis of the links between the financial sector and growth in the 
nonfinancial sector.  This paper contains such an analysis looking at 8 nonfinancial sectors in 28 
countries over 1960-2005. 
Real GDP growth is used frequently as a first order approximation of welfare gains.  This 
induces us to use the value added of each sector as a proxy for its flow contribution to economic activity.  
As a key role of financial services is to support economic growth, our econometric specification 
accounts for the marginal contribution of lagged growth of financial services on the growth of other 
sectors, all measured in terms of their value added. The analysis focuses on the symmetry/asymmetry 
patterns of financial deepening cycles (slower increases, more abrupt collapses).  Similar questions arise 
regarding the boom-bust cycles triggered by financial depth cycles, measured as discrete 
positive/negative jumps in the growth rate of real financial sector value-added. The presence of what 
Rajan (2006) dubbed the “hidden tail risk” manifests itself in negative skewness and high degree of 
kurtosis in the real growth rate of the financial sector. The asymmetries in the patterns of financial 2 
deepening are evident in the statistical analysis of higher moments (skewness, kurtosis) of financial 
sector growth rates. Furthermore, we find that a higher rate of financial sector growth relative to GDP 
raises the likelihood of future financial contractions. Philippon (2008) pointed out that such a pattern is 
present in the GDP share of the financial industry in the U.S. At the aggregate level, Hassan, Sanchez 
and Yu (2011) study the association between financial deepening and economic growth while Cardarelli, 
Elekdag and Lall (2011) study determinants of financial stress transmission to the real sectors. 
Given the negative skewness and “fat tail” feature of financial sector growth rates, we pay 
special attention to the asymmetric association between rare sharp financial expansions and contractions 
and the growth rates of the various sectors.  This section complements earlier work by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Tong and Wei (2011) as well as a study by Do and Levchenko (2007) and two studies 
conducted by Aizenman and Sushko (2011a, 2011b), who examine how financial development and 
capital flows interact with external financial dependence of firms to contribute to their market values 
and growth. The present paper is unique in three ways: first, we focus explicitly on the determinants and 
the subsequent impact of “rare” events in financial sector development on the real economy; second, we 
analyze the impact of financial sector boom-bust cycles on different real economic sectors, allowing us 
to identify the ones that are most vulnerable; third, we examine how the adverse effect of such rare yet 
large events is amplified/mitigated by a country’s financial openness and holdings of international 
reserves.  
Our analysis proceeds in the following stages.  First, we examine time-series dynamics of the 
financial sector. For robustness we use two different methodologies to identify financial sector shocks. 
The first is based on a band-pass filer where turning points in the cyclical component of value added 
series are identified. The second approach is based on identifying structural breaks in the growth rate of 
financial sector value added. We find that cycles in financial sector value added Granger-cause non-
financial sector cycles with a negative sign. This may be because greater deviations of financial sector 
growth from the trend are associated with sharp reversions in the near term. We test for this possibility 
by applying a probit specification to negative structural breaks in the growth rate of financial sector 
value added. We find that abrupt financial contractions are more likely to take place following a period 
of accelerated growth of the financial sector.  We validate the ‘up by the stairs, down by the parachute’  
dynamics (see Breedon (2001) who coined in the expression “up by the stairs, down by the elevator” in 
the context of foreign exchange markets) – the faster the acceleration of the financial sector the greater 
its predictive power of a subsequent bust. 3 
Next, we use financial contractions (expansions) identified as either structural breaks in the 
growth rate or turning points in the cyclical components of value added of the financial sector in each 
country as explanatory variable for the growth rates of non-financial sector value added. Overall, all 
sectors except for mining and public utilities are affected by sharp contractions in the financial sector 
within a year’s time. The construction sector is the most sensitive. In contrast, virtually none of the 
sectors are affected by sharp expansions of the financial sector. The panel regressions also control for 
the lagged value added growth for all non-financial sectors (including a lagged dependent variable), the 
sector’s productivity level, and country-level macro controls:	banking and currency crisis dummies, the 
depth of financial sector in the economy, inflation, share of government spending in the economy, 
financial and trade openness, and the real interest rate.  In addition to the baseline controls, we consider 
a specification that includes additional controls for structural and institutional features of each country, 
including the GDP shares of agriculture and industry, political stability, rule of law, and regulatory 
quality.  This allows us to obtain rich results regarding the sensitivity of the sectors to financial 
expansions and contractions. We also assess cumulative economic impact of financial sector 
contractions on the real economy.   
  A key focus of our analysis is in identifying factors that magnify or mitigate the impact of 
financial contractions.   We proceed by adding an interaction term between financial contractions and 
financial openness, and find that all the adverse effect of financial contractions on the real economy 
works through the financial openness channel.  In addition, we include the international reserves to GDP 
ratio and its interaction with financial contractions. We find that reserves buffer the economy during 
episodes of sharp financial contraction, mitigating the adverse growth effects of financial busts. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that countries in which the severity of the financial shock is 
magnified by financial openness may rely on foreign exchange reserves to mitigate the adverse impact 
of such capital flight on the real sectors. The non-linear impact of reserves is most prominent in the 
sectors identified as most vulnerable to financial contractions: for construction sector, a 1 percentage 
point higher reserves to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.2 percentage point higher value added growth 
rate on average, but a 2.8 percentage point higher growth rate in times of financial contraction, hence 
partially offsetting the effect of financial contractions.   
  In order to examine the impact of particularly large contractions, we classify as contractions only 
those episodes in which the fall in the growth rate of the financial sector real value added exceeded the 
median of all contractions in absolute value.  We find that the negative impact of financial openness and 4 
the offsetting positive effect of the stock of foreign exchange reserves are magnified during particularly 
large financial contraction episodes. This applies to construction and other sensitive sectors 
(manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and transportation). 
Section 2 overviews the data, section 3 examines cyclical dynamics and asymmetries in the 
growth rate of financial sector value added, and outlines the methodology for dating expansion and 
contraction episodes , section 4 conducts a panel regression analysis of the impact of financial 
contractions on the real sector and the transmission channels. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2.  Data 
 
We obtain annual data on real value added and employment in 10 broad economic sectors 
covering a panel of 28 countries constructed by Timmer and de Vries (2009) through Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre (GGDC), 10-Industry Database (http://www.ggdc.net).  The data cover the 
years 1947 through 2005; however, up to 1949 data on only 4 countries are available with the coverage 
jumping sharply to 26 in 1950 and to 28 in 1960.  The 10 sectors are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
public utilities (electricity, gas, and water), construction, wholesale and retail (including hotels, 
restaurants); transport, storage, and communication; community, social, and personal services; 
government services, and finance, insurance, and real estate. Previous studies using the GGDC data 
include McMillan and Rodrik (2011). Following these authors, we increase the level of aggregation to 9 
sectors by combing the data on community, social, and personal services with government services, 
because a number of countries, especially in Latin America, do not distinguish between the two when 
reporting employment or value added. We refer to the consolidated sector collectively as government.
1 
The additional controls, including real GDP per capita, domestic credit, inflation rates, real 
interest rates, and the agricultural and industrial shares of the economy, were obtained from World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Political stability, rule of law, and regulatory 
quality indicators were obtained from the World Bank Governance Indicators database 
(http://www.govindicators.org) from indexes constructed by Kaufmann et al (2009). Data on 
government consumption as a share of GDP and annual value of imports and exports as a share of GDP 
                                                            
1 As Timmer and de Vries (2007) point out, some activities in government services are nevertheless traded through markets. 
For example many personal services, but also private education and health services should be part of “market services”. 
Government services may also include value added from public investment projects. However, the data is not detailed 
enough to distinguish market from non-market in these sectors. 5 
were obtained from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten (2009)). We construct de-facto 
financial openness measures using the updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations 
Mark II database developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as the ratio of the sum of total financial 
assets and financial liabilities to GDP. Finally, we relied on Calvo and Reinhart (2000) to construct 
banking crisis and currency crisis.
2 
 
Table 1 [about here] 
 
Table 1 shows pairwise correlation statistics for sectoral growth rates. The highest degree of 
contemporaneous correlation is observed between public utilities and financial sector followed by 
construction and financial sector (with correlation coefficients of 0.84 and 0.66 respectively). 
 
3.  Financial cycles and abrupt contractions 
 
The focus on financial sector expansions and contractions necessarily assumes the existence of 
the so-called “financial cycle,” with booms and busts possibly leading to serious consequences for the 
real economy. This section examines the cyclical dynamics in financial sector value added.  We then use 
two methodologies to date the incidences of shocks to the financial sector. One is based on turning 
points in the cyclical component of the series (identified using a frequency filter) and the other is based 
on structural breaks in the series (identified using a unit root test). Section 4 then proceeds to estimate 
the impact of financial sector shocks on the reals sectors. 
Following recent literature such as Aikman et al (2011) we use a frequency filter to extract the 
cycle component in the value added of each sector. We apply the band-pass filter suggested by 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In 
parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it range 
from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years (the frequeyncy found to capture the 
duration of the financial cycle better when measured by credit, Drehmann et al (2012))).  Figure 1 (top 
panel) shows the results using Argentina as an example. Comparing the cycles in financial sector value 
                                                            
2 The period from 2000 through 2005 represents a time of stable economic growth in most countries in our sample, also 
known as the “Great Moderation” (Stock and Watson (2002)). The exception to this is Argentina, where a crisis lasted from 
1999 through 2002.  6 
added with non-financial sector total (the sum of logs of the other series, excluding government), 
financial sector cycles appear more volatile and that volatility has been increasing over time.
3  
Table 2 presents the results of Granger-causality regressions based on 1-lag specification. The 
table shows the results in a panel setting, both using fixed effects and country dummies. The two left 
columns show results in levels of the filtered series while the right two columns show regression results 
in first differences. The coefficients on lagged deviations from trend in financial sector value added are 
negative in all four specifications and statistically significant at 10 percent or better in three out of four 
cases. The negative association between financial sector expansions and future real sector contractions is 
robust to controlling for lagged real sector growth.  Positive coefficients on lagged dependent variable, 
in turn, indicate that expansions and contractions of the real sector tend to be fairly persistent.
4 
 
Table 2 [about here] 
 
The negative association between in the cyclical component of financial sector and future real 
sector growth may be due to the notion that financial sector growth is subject to abrupt reversals, which 
are more likely to take place following period of accelerated growth (‘up by the stairs, down by the 
parachute’ dynamic). This feature of asymmetric booms and busts in financial industry was pointed out 
previously by Philippon (2008) for the U.S.   
In order to address this possibility, we examine how greater financial sector value added growth 
affects the likelihood of future sharp financial contractions.  Table 3 shows summary statistics for 
financial sector real value added growth rates (calculated as log differences of dollar amounts at 1995 
prices) for each country. The mean growth rate for each country is positive; however, the series for 17 
out of the 28 countries exhibit negative skewness.  These countries, mostly emerging markets, are: 
Argentina; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Denmark; Hong Kong SAR, China; India; Indonesia; 
Italy; Korea; Mexico; Philippines; Singapore; Sweden; Thailand; United States; and Venezuela. In 
contrast, as can be seen from Table 3, countries with positively skewed financial sector growth series 
                                                            
3 Results for total non-financial sector (including government), and individual real sectors have been omitted for 
brevity but are available upon request. 
4 Table A1 shows analogous results for time-series regressions at country level. The top panes show results in 
level and bottom panes show results in first differences. While the association between financial and real cycles 
differs across countries, 12 out of 15 (11 out of 16) significant coefficients on lagged financial sector cyclical 
component in levels (first differences) are negative. Among advanced economies, the negative Granger-causality 
result is robust to both specifications in Spain, Sweden, and the U.S. Among emerging markets, the negative 
association holds in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan. 7 
include mostly OECD economies. Furthermore, the average level of kurtosis is higher for countries with 
negative skew in the series (6.619 compared to 5.527).  
 
Table 3 [about here] 
 
Combined, the summary statistics indicate fat tails and higher frequency of occurrences of 
sudden declines in financial sector value added than predicted by a symmetric normal distribution, 
corroborating that notion that financial industry, while growing over the long-run, is subject to abrupt, 
periodic contractions. Furthermore, this feature is more pronounced in emerging markets and a sub-
group of developed countries, namely Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. 
We use a binary choice regression methodology in order to examine whether sharp financial 
sector contractions are more likely to follow a period of accelerated financial sector growth. We define 
financial contractions (expansions) as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial 
sector in each country (identified according to the innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test in 
Clemente, Montanes, Reyes (1998)) followed by positive (negative) growth. In order to examine the 
impact of particularly large contractions, we reclassify as contractions only those episodes in which the 
fall in the growth rate of the financial sector real value added exceeded the median of all contractions in 
absolute value (those exceeding the sample median of -9.34 percent drop in financial sector real value 
added over one year).
 5  Using a probit model, for a country k we estimate the conditional probability of 
LARGE financial contractions, FIN.CONTRACTIONk,t=1, given the set of controls: 
 
Pr    .            ,   1      , ,         , , , ,  1 Φ    ,             , 
′   (1) 
 
                                                            
5 The cutoff is given by Argentina’s contraction episode in 2000, when during the onset of the crisis the annual 
growth rate of the financial sector fell to -9.43 percent. The Argentine crisis lasted several years; however we are 
interested in the immediate impact of financial contractions on the real sector, as during the subsequent years of 
the crisis the channels of contagion are likely to multiply and become more complex. Moreover, only the initial 
phase of each crisis in our sample is characterized by a negative structural break in the financial sector growth 
rate, with subsequent years either exhibiting a reversal or a persistently low (or negative) growth rate, making it 
appropriate to rely on the quasi-event study approach employed in this paper with dummy variables for the year 
of structural break. Finally, to the extent that we control for currency and banking crises years, we are able to pick 
up the impact of financial contractions on the real sectors in isolation and irrespective of the cause of the 
underlying contraction or the duration of the crisis. 8 
where   ,  ≡
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     , denotes the difference of 
either 3-year or 5-year average growth rate of financial sector real value added to the average GDP 
growth rate, one year before the contraction episode. Thus, the ratio captures the degree to which the 
growth rate of the financial sector exceeded the growth rate of GDP. A positive β would indicate that the 
likelihood of sharp financial contraction is increasing in the excess growth of financial sector relative to 
GDP 3 or 5 years prior. Φ( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable 
and the vector of controls includes currency crisis dummy and lagged logarithm of government spending 
one year prior.
6 We also repeat the exercise using a logit model, because it has the advantage of 
producing a better fit to the extremes of the distribution. The banking crisis dummy is dropped from the 
controls because it predicts the outcome of large financial contractions perfectly, that is all large 
negative financial sector shocks are also accompanied by banking crises in our sample. The estimation is 
conducted with robust standard errors clustered by country, as several countries in the sample undergo 
more than one contraction episode.  
 
Table 4 [about here] 
 
  Table 4 shows the estimation results. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) show results based on probit 
while columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) show results based on logit regressions, with and without lagged 
government spending as a control variable. The top panel calculates the excess of the financial sector 
growth rate relative to GDP using 3-year averages while the bottom panel uses 5-year averages. As 
expected, the coefficients on currency crises are highly significant, indicating a strong association with 
sharp contractions in financial sector growth. Despite the inclusion of the crises dummies, the 
coefficients on growth rate of financial sector relative to GDP growth preceding sharp contractions are 
also significant, indicating that excess financial sector growth is a strong predictor of a large subsequent 
contraction. Both the magnitude and the level of significance of the coefficients are higher when 3-year 
rather than 5-year averages are used, indicating that is it the immediate acceleration of financial sector 
                                                            
6 Under a logistical distribution:	Φ         ,           , 
   / 1        ,           , 
     9 
that has the highest probability of resulting in a bust. This finding applies universally to large number of 
developing and developed countries in our sample.
7  
Having obtained the coefficient vector, we can evaluate the marginal effect of financial sector 
growth accelerations on the conditional expectation of a LARGE financial contraction: 
 
      .            ,      , ,         , ,   ,   , 
   , 
 Φ         ̅ ,                    , 
         .   (2) 
 
where the marginal contribution of each conditioning variable to the probability of 
FIN.CONTRACTIONk,t=1 is estimated at the sample average of government expenditures and currency 
crisis dummy set to 1. We use coefficient estimates of      from probit specification (2) and logit 
specification (4) in Table 4 to calculate lower and upper bounds of the marginal effect of excess 
financial sector growth on the probability of a future financial contraction according to equation (2). The 
marginal effect based on the probit specification (2) in Table 4 is 0.038 while that based on the logit 
specification (4) is 0.043, indicating financial contractions have approximately 4 percent greater 
probability of occurrence if during the preceding 3 years the growth rate of the financial sector value 
added was double that of the average GDP growth over the same period.  
 
4.  Impact of financial sector shocks on the real sectors 
 
  Our baseline regression model is based on Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011), but focusing on 
sectoral rather than aggregate growth rates. Let        , ,   denote the real value added growth rate of 
sector i in country k in year t. Diminishing returns in the neoclassical growth model imply a positive 
convergence parameter λ such that: 
       , ,       
     	     




     	     
        , , 
       ( 3 )  
where  
     	     
        
 , 
∗
denotes the long-run real value added per worker implicitly determined by 
structural parameters in the economy.  The growth rate of real sectors, (3), is expected to diminish as 
their value added per worker converges to the latent potential level of output per worker, 
                                                            
7 The statistically significant positive association between size of government spending and financial contractions 
may have several interpretations, including : the crowding out of private investment and deficits financed through 
inflationary policies; we leave these questions for further research. 10 
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. Since the technological frontier in each sector in each country is unobservable, 
following Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) we assume that it is a function of economic fundamentals in 
each country. Therefore, for each sector i we estimate the following model: 
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The first two terms on the RHS are financial sector expansion and contraction dummies respectively. 
These terms capture perturbations due to abrupt changes in financial sector growth. The third term 
captures any persistence in the annual value added growth rate of sector i in country k as well as its 
association with lagged growth in other real sectors.
8 The fourth term (the vector of controls,	  , ) 
represents determinants of long-run growth and the country level (common to all sectors). The vector of 
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where a country’s level of financial deepening is controlled for using the credit to GDP ratio. As 
equation (5) shows, we control for exogenous economic downturns with banking and currency crises 
dummies. Following Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) we also control for income, inflation, share of 
government spending in the economy, financial and trade openness defined, and the real interest rate. As 
explained in greater detail in the data section, we use de-facto measures for both financial and trade 
                                                            
8 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) panel unit root test to test the null unit root in first differences. 
Table A3 reports the results. The p-values indicate that the null of unit root is strongly rejected, indicating that the 
financial sector growth series is stationary. Furthermore, the p-values of intermediate ADF test results indicate 
that the null of unit root is rejected for each country in the sample in favor of stationarity. 11 
openness. Financial openness is defined as the sum of a country’s total foreign assets and liabilities 
relative to GDP while trade openness is defines as exports plus imports relative to GDP. 
  In addition to the baseline controls, we consider a specification that includes additional controls 
for economic and institutional features of each country: 
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Finally, following specification (3) we controls for an industry’s relative output difference with the long-
run level via the lagged real value added per worker term,  
     	     
        , ,   
 . Since the dependent 
variable and the first term on the RHS are constructed using contemporaneous and up to 2
nd lag value of 
real value added we include 3
rd lag of real value added per worker in order to avoid serial correlation in 
the error term of regression (4). 
Tables 5 and 6 report panel regression results based on equation (4), Table 5 identifies financial 
sector expansions and contractions as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added while Table 6 
provides a robustness check using alternative methodology based on turning points in the cyclical 
components of the series. The results in Table 5 show that all sectors except for mining and public 
utilities are affected by sharp contractions in the financial sector within a year’s time. The construction 
sector is the most sensitive. In contrast,  none of the sectors are affected by sharp expansions of the 
financial sector
9. The coefficients estimates indicate that on average a financial sector contraction 
episodes are associated with a 11.9 percent drop in construction sector value added in the following 
year. The sensitivities of other sectors are considerably lower with the estimates indicating 
approximately 3 percent drop in the value added in agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale & retails, and 
transportation in the year following a negative shock to the financial sector. The negative impact is 
robust to reclassifying financial sector ups and downs as turning points in the cyclical component 
extracted using a band-pass filter (Table 6). 6 out of 7 non-financial sectors show a significant negative 
response to financial contractions within a year, but only one sector shows a positive response to turning 
                                                            
9 These results are robust to alternative lag structures of up to 5years 12 
points leading to financial sector expansions. The lower values of coefficient estimates are consistent 
with the difference in the two methodologies used to identify financial sectors contraction and expansion 
episodes: the Clemente, Montanes, Reyes (1998) unit-root test based dating methodology (Table 5) 
identifies up to two largest structural breaks, whereas the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2005) band-pass 
filter results in as many turning points as cyclical deviations from tern identified in the series. Figure 1 
shows an illustrative example for the case of Argentina. Hence, the results reported in Table 5 capture 
the impact of fewer but more severe downturns and upturns in the financial sector compared to the 
results reported in Table 6. 
 
Tables 5 & 6 [about here] 
 
Consistent with diminishing marginal returns of the convergence hypothesis on which our 
empirical specification rest, all the coefficients on the “convergence factor” are negative and statistically 
significant at 5 percent level of higher. The estimates range from -0.039 for the transportation sector to -
0.017 for wholesale, retail and agricultural sectors.  
The coefficients on banking and currency crises are negative in all the specifications; however, 
the sectors exhibit different degrees of sensitivity to such episodes. Currency crises have the most 
adverse impact on construction sector growth (coefficient of -0.028), while public utilities sectors are 
most affected by banking crises followed by the manufacturing sectors (coefficients of approximately -
0.028). Manufacturing sector is the only one that exhibits significant negative response to banking and 
currency crises. The coefficients on remaining controls are generally consistent with theory. Inflation 
and government spending exhibit a negative association with sectoral value added growth, while trade 
openness has a positive association.
1011  
Based on regression results it is also possible to calculate the cumulative effect of financial 
contractions. Since equation (4) contains a lagged endogenous variable, the cumulative effect of 
financial contraction on the growth rate of sector i in country k in period t can be expressed as 
   
 , / 1   ∅ ), where the linear impact of contractions,    
 ,  , is adjusted for the AR(1) structure in the 
regression. In addition, we estimate the cumulative impact on the aggregate real sector growth rate as the 
                                                            
10 The data on government spending obtained from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009), which includes collective 
consumption of government for public good type activities, like police (at constant prices). 
11 Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix show analogous results based on regressions that include an expanded set of 
controls for economic and institutional features of each country. 13 
sum across all i sectors of partial impact on each sector weighted by that sector’s share in total real 
economy value added in country k in period t. The relative shares of each sector during financial 
contraction episodes are listed in Table 7. In computing the real value added shares, financial and 
government sectors are excluded from the denominator. India boasted the largest share of agricultural 
sector, at 53.1 percent of total real non-government sectors [when], followed by Latin American 
countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica (at 33.1 and 38.6 percent), and Asian economies such as 
Philippines and Malaysia (at 27.0 and 25.5 percent).  In contrast, OECD countries such as United 
Kingdom and Sweden, as well as Taiwan, China, exhibit the largest relative shares of manufacturing 
sector value added, 40.6, 41.0, and 46.4 percent respectively. Wholesale and retail sector is another 
important component for a number of countries under consideration, especially Latin American 
economies such as Costa Rica and Argentina with relative weights of this sector at 31.7 and 28.6 percent 
respectively. Overall, construction sector ranks behind agriculture, manufacturing, and wholesale and 
retail sectors for most of the economies, occupying similar share as transportation and storage. As such, 
we expect the sensitivity of the construction sector to financial shocks to be dampened by its smaller 
size relative to other sectors, reducing the transmission of financial contractions when considering the 
entire real sector. Public utilities sector is the smallest in relative size for all cross-sections. 
 
Table 7 [about here] 
 
  Table 8 shows the estimates of the cumulative impact of financial contractions on total non-
financial sector value added growth rate. The third column of Table 8 shows the actual magnitude of the 
financial contraction in percentage changes relative to the previous year. The fourth column shows the 
cumulative impact on the real sector calculated as a weighted sum of cumulative effects on individual 
sectors. The firth column shows analogous estimates scaled by the size of the actual financial 
contraction relative to the sample mean. The financial contraction episodes associated with the largest 
predicted cumulative impact belong to 1982 Chile, 1997 Indonesia, 1983 Philippines, and 1983 Chile. 
 
Table 8 [about here] 
 
  The association between financial openness of an economy and the degree to which sharp 
contractions in financial sector growth translate into contractions of the real economy is addressed in 14 
results reported in Table 9.
12  This specification adds an interaction term between financial contractions 
and financial openness. Once the interaction term is included in the regressions, the coefficients on 
financial contraction dummies themselves become either insignificant or positive, indicating that the 
entire adverse effect of financial contractions on the real economy works through the financial openness 
channel. Again, the construction sector exhibits the highest sensitivity to financial contractions 
propagated through cross-border capital flows, with a coefficient of -0.233 (bottom panel of Table 9), 
followed by transportation (-0.156), wholesale and retail (-0.131), and manufacturing (-0.105).   
  In addition to the interaction with financial openness, the regression specification used in Table 9 
includes the reserves to GDP ratio and its interaction with financial contractions. This extension is 
motivated by an extensive literature on foreign exchange reserves that points out the merits of reserve 
accumulation stemming from precautionary motives to mitigate the adverse effects of capital flight. The 
coefficients on both the linear reserves/GDP ratio and its interaction with financial contractions are 
positive – a higher reserves chest is associated with higher value added growth rates of the real sectors. 
Furthermore, comparing the coefficients on Lag (reserves/gdp) and on Lag fin. contraction × 
(reserves/gdp) in both top and bottom panels of Table 9, the coefficients on the interaction terms are 10 
to 15 times greater in magnitude. Since the interaction term captures the association between foreign 
exchange reserves specifically in times of financial contractions (when Lag financial contraction 
dummy takes on the value 1), this indicates that the positive effect of reserves on real sector growth is 
especially prominent during the episodes of sharp financial contraction. This finding suggests that 
countries in which the severity of the financial shock is magnified by financial openness rely on foreign 
exchange reserves to mitigate the adverse impact of such capital flight on the real sectors. The non-
linear impact of reserves is most prominent in the sectors identified as most vulnerable to financial 
contractions: for construction sector, a 1 percentage point higher reserves to GDP ratio is associated with 
0.2 percent higher value added growth rate on average, but a 2.8 percent higher growth rate in times of 
financial contractions (hence partially offsetting the effect of financial contractions).
13 However, the 
                                                            
12 For brevity, the coefficient estimates on the remaining controls have been omitted from the table, as they do not 
vary significantly when interaction terms are included. The complete results are available upon request. 
13 Regression coefficients on financial openness and the reserves-to-GDP ratio have different interpretations 
because of the way the data have been normalized: reserves-to-GDP ratio is in integer percentage points (1 unit 
increase in the variable represents a 1 percentage point rise) as in the WDI database, whereas other variables are 
in decimal percentage points (1 unit increase in the variable represents a 100 percentage point rise). The 
coefficient of 0.028 on interaction with the reserves-to-GDP ratio indicates that a 1 percentage point higher 
reserves relative to GDP during contractions is associated with 2.8 percent higher growth rate of construction 
sector real value added. In contrast, the coefficient of -0.233 on the interaction term with financial openness 15 
contribution of reserves, while significantly positive, is not enough to eliminate the negative impact of 
financial openness as the propagation mechanism in the most sensitive sectors of construction and 
transportation. For instance, taking the case of Argentina in 1989 (which had total foreign financial 
assets and liabilities summing to approximately 130 percent of GDP), its stockpile of foreign exchange 
reserves is estimated to have reduced the decline in the construction industry from over 30 to less than 
10 percent. Similar observations, albeit of differing magnitude, can be made regarding other financial 
contraction episodes. 
  The dominance of financial openness in accounting for the negative effect of financial 
contractions on the real economy suggests that most of the significant financial sector contractions 
during our sample period probably resulted from sharp reversals in foreign financial capital inflows, or 
sudden-stops. Table 10 lists year-country pairs of the financial contraction episodes along with the 
magnitude of the actual contraction (the percentage change in financial sector real value added relative 
to the previous year). The third column indicates whether that episode matches with an episode of 
sudden-stop identified by past literature. Of the 12 post-1980 financial contraction episodes, 9 are 
associated with a sudden-stop. 
 
Table 9 [about here] 
 
The economic literature on sudden stops was motivated by the 1994 Mexican crisis, with 
episodes of sudden-stops subsequently identified for many emerging market economies going back to 
the 1980s, the period of substantial cross-border private capital flow liberalization. The link between 
sudden stops and output loss has also been excessively investigated in recent years. In particular, 
consistent with short-run dynamics between financial contractions and drops in real sector value added 
growth rates identified in this paper, Hutchison and Noy (2006) find that sudden-stop crises have a large 
but short-lived negative effect on output over and above that of currency crises. Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000) attribute the link between sudden-stops and output collapses to the credit channel, whereby 
abrupt stops in foreign capital inflows cause local credit markets to dry up, thus reducing investment and 
domestic demand. A related channel, emphasized by Mendoza (2001), concerns the combined effect of 
sudden-stops and currency crises, whereby the deterioration of collateral in the financial sector causes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
indicates a 1 percentage point greater de-facto openness during contractions is associated with  0.2 percent lower 
growth rate of construction sector real value added. The economic significance of these offsetting effects depends 
not only on the elasticities, but on the average values of each variable as discussed later in the text. 16 
debt deflation followed by real contraction. Against this theoretical backdrop, our regression results 
identify industries most susceptible to credit contractions and deteriorations in financial collateral values 
induced by a sudden-stop. The construction sector appears the most sensitive, followed by transportation 
(which also includes the highly credit-based shipping industry), wholesale and retail trade, and 
manufacturing.  
  Given the complex non-linear associations between financial contractions and real sector growth 
rates, we repeat the exercise of interacting financial contraction dummies with financial openness and 
foreign exchange reserves focusing only on the right-hand side of the distribution of financial 
contraction episodes, i.e., really big contractions. As Table 10 shows, the size of the contraction varies 
greatly by for each episode. Latin American economies experienced some of the largest drops in 
financial sector growth: with Venezuela experiencing a 35.9 percent drop in 1960, Costa Rica 
experiencing a 55.0 percent drop in 1959, and Chile experiencing a whopping 83.5 percent contraction 
in real financial sector value added in 1982. Several Asian economies also underwent large financial 
contractions, with Indonesia experiencing a 28.4 percent drop in 1997 during the Asian Financial Crisis. 
On the other hand, financial contractions in other, especially European economies, tended to be much 
smaller in magnitude. For instance, in 1951 Britain’s financial sector growth rate simply declined to 
zero, while Sweden experienced mild contractions of 0.6 and 2.8 percent in 1975 and 1992 respectively.  
 
Table 10 [about here] 
 
In order to examine the impact of particularly large contractions, we reclassify as contractions 
only those episodes in which the fall in the growth rate of the financial sector real value added exceeded 
the median of all contractions in absolute value (those exceeding the sample median of -9.34 percent 
drop in financial sector real value added over one year).  As the results in Table 11 show, the negative 
impact of financial openness and the offsetting positive effect of the stock of foreign exchange reserves 
are magnified during particularly large financial contraction episodes. In the construction sector 
regressions, the coefficient on the interaction of financial contraction with financial openness is -0.66 
(compared to -0.23 when all negative structural breaks in financial growth are counted as contractions as 
in Table 9). Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction of financial contraction with the reserves to GDP 
ratio is 0.083 (compared to 0.028 in the unrestricted specification). A similar pattern is observed for 17 
other sensitive sectors (manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and transportation), with the coefficient on 
the interaction terms doubling or tripling in absolute value.  
 
Table 11 [about here] 
 
5.  Conclusion and future research 
 
Our empirical study validates the asymmetric nature of financial intermediation whereby 
financial contractions are associated with a large decline in the value added of key real sectors but 
financial expansions do not seem to have much effect.  This asymmetric feature was pointed out 
previously by Philippon (2008) for the U.S., and we find that it applies more universally to a large 
number of developing and developed countries.  This finding is important, as the U.S.’s position as the 
supplier of the key global currency allows it to buffer its exposure to financial contractions by the FED’s 
quantitative easing policies, de facto supplying the key reserve currency elastically.  Emerging markets 
and developing countries, which lack this capacity, would therefore benefit by paying more attention to 
the factors magnifying and mitigating their exposure to costly financial contractions.   
For this latter group of countries, our finding that the adverse effects of abrupt financial 
contractions are magnified by financial openness and mitigated by international reserves has special 
significance.  Remarkably, 9 out of the 12 post-1980 financial contraction episodes were identified as 
sudden stops in capital flows, all except for Sweden in 1992 in emerging markets.  This demonstrated 
vulnerability to capital account openness finds its echo in the prevalent “self-insurance” trend among 
emerging markets, where the growing financial integration of the last two decades exposed them to 
sudden stops and capital flight crises, propagating an unprecedented accumulation of international 
reserves to serve as a financial buffer in turbulent times [see Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh and Taylor (2010).  Aizenman and Pinto (2011) review the policy lessons].   
We also find that abrupt financial contractions are more likely to take place following periods of 
accelerated growth in the financial sector– the more immediate the acceleration of the financial sector, 
the greater its predictive power of a subsequent bust. Our analysis can be extended in numerous ways.  
With more detailed data, one would be able to evaluate the contribution of financial accelerations and 
contractions to the productivity of the economy, identifying more precisely the conditions under which 
too rapid expansion of financial intermediation is inefficient and destabilizing to the real economy.     18 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Pairwise correlations of value added growth rates for the 9 sectors. 
 
Notes: * indicates correlation coefficients significant at 10 percent level of higher, p-values in parentheses.  The highest 
degree of contemporaneous correlation is observed between public utilities and financial sector followed by construction and 
financial sector (with correlation coefficients of 0.84 and 0.66 respectively).  
 
   
Finance Agriculture Construction Government Mining Manufacturing Public utilities Transportation
Agriculture 0.0533* 1
(0.0444)
Construction 0.6573* 0.1091* 1
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Government 0.2544* 0.1084* 0.2766* 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Mining 0.039 0.0419 0.0861* 0.1039* 1
(0.1410) (0.1143) (0.0012) (0.0001)
Manufacturing 0.1699* 0.1537* 0.4036* 0.3125* 0.1745* 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Public utilities 0.8433* 0.0284 0.5896* 0.2001* 0.0723* 0.2069* 1
(0.0000) (0.2838) (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0064 (0.0000)
Transportation -0.1583* 0.1147* 0.1195* 0.2897* 0.1018* 0.5314* -0.1714*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Wholesale, retail -0.4761* 0.0918* -0.0777* 0.3582* 0.1084* 0.4539* -0.4989* 0.6070* 
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)21 
Table 2: Granger-causality regressions between the cyclical component of financial sector value added and the 
non-financial sector. 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cyclical component identified using the band-pass 
filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2005) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In 
parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it range from 2 years (lower 
























Dep. Var.: CF(Non-fin. Value added)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag CF(Fin. Value added) -0.048* -0.048**
(0.024) (0.022)
Lag CF(Non-fin. Value added) 0.788*** 0.788***
(0.039) (0.030)
Lag Change in CF(Fin. Value added) -0.033*** -0.033
(0.012) (0.028)
Lag Change in CF(Non-fin. Value added) 0.593*** 0.593***
(0.026) (0.038)
Constant 0.005*** 0.172*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.004)
Fixed effects yes no yes no
Country dummies no yes no yes
Observations 1,423 1,423 1,395 1,395
R-squared 0.467 0.991 0.256 0.257
Number of countries 28 28
Levels First differences22 
Table 3: Summary statistics for yr/yr % chng. in value added (1995 prices) of financial sector. 
  
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for real value added growth rates (calculated as log differences of dollar 
amounts at 1995 prices) for each country for financial sector. Note that the GGDC 10-Industry Database includes 
insurance and real estate services into the financial sector. The mean growth rate for each country is positive; however, 
the series for 17 out of the 28 countries exhibit negative skewedness.  Furthermore, the average level of kurtosis is higher 
for countries with negative skew in the series (6.619 compared to 5.527). Combined, the summary statistic indicate fat 
tails and higher frequency of occurrences of sudden declines in financial sector value added then predicted by a 
symmetric normal distribution, corroborating that notion that financial industry, while growing in the long-run, is subject 






Country  Mean  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs.
Argentina 0.022 0.185 -0.220 0.076 -0.382 4.255 55
Bolivia 0.038 0.347 -0.405 0.118 -0.615 5.782 55
Brazil 0.054 0.231 -0.084 0.065 0.159 2.801 55
Chile 0.050 0.650 -0.835 0.172 -1.833 16.186 55
Colombia 0.061 0.247 -0.152 0.070 -0.404 5.097 55
Costa Rica 0.061 0.341 -0.550 0.120 -2.204 14.817 55
Denmark 0.040 0.140 -0.034 0.032 0.763 4.240 58
France 0.039 0.101 -0.008 0.028 0.561 2.350 55
Germany 0.060 0.116 0.025 0.023 0.565 2.503 41
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.068 0.189 -0.070 0.061 -0.132 3.126 31
India 0.081 0.195 -0.100 0.059 -0.568 3.375 55
Indonesia 0.095 0.542 -0.284 0.131 -0.209 6.926 43
Italy 0.034 0.071 -0.007 0.020 -0.092 2.149 54
Japan 0.068 0.358 -0.191 0.079 0.550 7.044 51
Korea, Rep. 0.047 0.131 -0.075 0.041 -0.347 3.308 52
Malaysia 0.112 0.550 -0.019 0.092 3.071 15.946 35
Mexico 0.060 0.148 -0.084 0.048 -0.417 3.768 55
Netherlands 0.050 0.253 -0.031 0.043 2.443 12.883 45
Peru 0.050 0.222 -0.117 0.062 0.336 4.364 55
Philippines 0.047 0.148 -0.216 0.077 -1.588 6.415 34
Singapore 0.090 0.171 -0.026 0.048 -0.347 2.303 45
Spain 0.044 0.142 -0.018 0.035 0.524 3.192 58
Sweden 0.031 0.065 -0.028 0.016 -1.008 5.808 55
Taiwan 0.095 0.261 -0.025 0.069 0.280 2.509 44
Thailand 0.093 0.437 -0.399 0.144 -1.073 6.074 54
United Kingdom 0.034 0.090 -0.011 0.021 0.226 2.961 58
United States 0.042 0.070 0.000 0.015 -0.707 3.560 58
Venezuela, RB 0.049 0.332 -0.359 0.117 -0.341 4.888 5523 
Table 4: Higher financial sector growth as a determinant of future contractions. 
 
Notes: Probit and logit regression estimation results with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate coefficients significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Banking crisis dummy excluded from the 
control vector because it predicts outcomes perfectly. The top panel calculates the excess of the financial sector growth rate 












dependent variable: LARGE financial contraction (1) (2) (3) (4)
lag dlog(value added fin.)-dlog(GDP), 3-yr. avg. 0.306** 0.297** 0.744*** 0.717***
(0.147) (0.150) (0.260) (0.265)
currencycrisis 1.410*** 1.376*** 3.667*** 3.472***
(0.273) (0.267) (0.737) (0.810)
lag log(govt spending) 0.804* 1.438
(0.471) (1.315)
Constant -2.907*** -5.176*** -6.298***-10.257***
(0.215) (1.274) (0.691) (3.427)
Pseudo R2 0.222 0.243 0.221 0.232
(5) (6) (7) (8)
lag dlog(value added fin.)-dlog(GDP), 5-yr. avg. 0.256* 0.247* 0.625** 0.601**
(0.132) (0.136) (0.255) (0.265)
currencycrisis 1.407*** 1.373*** 3.656*** 3.462***
(0.273) (0.268) (0.738) (0.811)
lag log(govt spending) 0.804* 1.441
(0.470) (1.313)
Constant -2.904*** -5.173*** -6.289***-10.256***
(0.216) (1.272) (0.691) (3.422)
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.242 0.220 0.231
Clustering by country yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,119 1,089 1,119 1,089
Probit Logit24 
Table 5: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – structural breaks – 
on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors. 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Financial contractions (expansions) defined as 
structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to Clemente, 
Motanes, Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative (positive) growth rate. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent var.: value added growth rate agriculture construction mining manufacturing public utilities wholesale, retail transportation
lag financial contraction -0.028* -0.119*** -0.020 -0.030* -0.005 -0.029* -0.032**
(0.016) (0.031) (0.033) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013)
lag financial expansion -0.008 0.021 -0.012 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.013*
(0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
convergence (value added per worker) -0.017** -0.022* -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.039***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
banking crisis -0.012 -0.026 0.004 -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.018* -0.009
(0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
currency crisis -0.003 -0.028* 0.005 -0.014* -0.012 -0.008 -0.010
(0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
log(gdp/cap) 1.313*** 1.463* -0.269 -0.594 -1.068** 0.183 0.733*
(0.469) (0.822) (0.824) (0.480) (0.480) (0.374) (0.386)
wdi_credit -0.019** -0.047*** -0.016 -0.014* -0.006 -0.027*** -0.009
(0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
log(inflation) -0.438** -1.201*** -0.512 -1.032*** -0.247 -0.865*** -0.230
(0.172) (0.332) (0.344) (0.167) (0.177) (0.158) (0.142)
log(govt spending) -0.845 -3.533 0.479 -1.919* -1.893 -1.737* -2.051**
(1.141) (2.192) (2.276) (1.105) (1.181) (1.050) (0.942)
de-facto financial openness 0.488 0.573 0.801 -0.361 1.001 -0.094 0.386
(0.877) (1.637) (1.694) (0.818) (0.871) (0.775) (0.700)
log(trade openness) -1.868** -3.922** 0.900 0.437 0.450 -0.742 1.782**
lagged value added growth: (0.924) (1.771) (1.860) (0.863) (0.940) (0.824) (0.752)
agriculature -0.284*** -0.068 0.048 -0.019 0.014 0.033 0.015
(0.033) (0.063) (0.066) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.027)
construction 0.010 0.136*** 0.009 -0.002 0.034 -0.009 0.023
(0.020) (0.039) (0.040) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017)
government 0.002 0.018 -0.011 -0.004 0.011 0.004 0.020
(0.022) (0.042) (0.044) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018)
mining -0.009 -0.003 0.169*** -0.003 0.014 -0.009 -0.007
(0.017) (0.033) (0.034) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
manufacturing 0.115** 0.061 -0.034 0.197*** 0.067 0.136*** 0.109***
(0.049) (0.094) (0.098) (0.047) (0.050) (0.045) (0.041)
public utilities -0.014 0.004 -0.079 -0.003 -0.050 0.025 0.013
(0.031) (0.060) (0.063) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.026)
transportation -0.039 0.167* -0.007 -0.087* -0.073 -0.050 0.062
(0.049) (0.093) (0.097) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.041)
wholesale, retail -0.023 0.185* -0.051 -0.011 0.024 0.099** 0.038
(0.052) (0.101) (0.105) (0.051) (0.054) (0.048) (0.043)
Constant 0.084** 0.276*** 0.132* 0.270*** 0.326*** 0.193*** 0.146***
(0.040) (0.091) (0.078) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034)
Observations 911 911 911 911 911 911 911
R-squared 0.105 0.170 0.061 0.240 0.214 0.189 0.173
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes25 
Table 6: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – turning 
points in the cyclical component – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors. 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cyclical component identified using the 
band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant 
(1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it 
range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent var.: value added growth rate agriculture construction mining manufacturing public utilities wholesale, retail transportation
lag financial contraction 0.003 -0.020** -0.028*** -0.009** -0.009* -0.014*** -0.008*
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
lag financial expansion -0.002 0.019** -0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.002
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
convergence (value added per worker) -0.017** -0.026** -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.038***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
banking crisis -0.013 -0.020 0.002 -0.027** -0.030** -0.016 -0.007
(0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
currency crisis -0.004 -0.032** 0.003 -0.015** -0.013 -0.009 -0.011*
(0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
log(gdp/cap) 0.013*** 0.014* -0.003 -0.007 -0.011** 0.001 0.007*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
wdi_credit -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(inflation) -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.011*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
log(govt spending) -0.008 -0.031 0.009 -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.019**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
de-facto financial openness 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
log(trade openness) -0.018* -0.036** 0.010 0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.019**
lagged value added growth: (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
agriculature -0.281*** -0.071 0.042 -0.021 0.010 0.029 0.015
(0.033) (0.063) (0.066) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.027)
construction 0.009 0.137*** 0.017 0.000 0.035* -0.006 0.024
(0.020) (0.039) (0.040) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017)
government 0.002 0.016 -0.014 -0.005 0.010 0.003 0.020
(0.022) (0.042) (0.044) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018)
mining -0.008 -0.001 0.173*** -0.002 0.014 -0.007 -0.006
(0.017) (0.033) (0.034) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
manufacturing 0.122** 0.045 -0.039 0.188*** 0.057 0.126*** 0.108***
(0.049) (0.095) (0.098) (0.048) (0.051) (0.045) (0.041)
public utilities -0.012 0.021 -0.071 0.002 -0.047 0.031 0.017
(0.031) (0.060) (0.062) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.026)
transportation -0.033 0.174* -0.007 -0.088* -0.077 -0.051 0.062
(0.049) (0.093) (0.097) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.041)
wholesale, retail -0.023 0.187* -0.064 -0.010 0.024 0.097** 0.036
(0.053) (0.101) (0.105) (0.051) (0.054) (0.048) (0.044)
Constant 0.078** 0.280*** 0.123 0.270*** 0.329*** 0.188*** 0.143***
(0.040) (0.091) (0.077) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034)
Observations 911 911 911 911 911 911 911
R-squared 0.102 0.164 0.070 0.241 0.217 0.195 0.168
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes26 
Table 7: Percentage shares of real value added within the total non-government, real economy sectors during financial contraction 
episodes. 
 
Notes: Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified 










Year Country Agriculture Construction Mining Manufacturing Public Utilities Wholesale, Retail Transportation
1951 United Kingdom 3.03% 9.38% 12.43% 40.58% 1.87% 23.11% 9.59%
1956 Colombia 33.10% 10.02% 4.96% 20.98% 1.82% 19.71% 9.41%
1959 Costa Rica 28.59% 7.33% 0.13% 23.61% 1.85% 31.70% 6.79%
1960 Venezuela 4.49% 9.07% 54.86% 12.70% 0.29% 14.87% 3.72%
1973 India 53.05% 6.46% 2.17% 16.32% 1.49% 14.31% 6.20%
1975 Sweden 7.53% 10.49% 1.09% 41.03% 4.05% 24.01% 11.80%
1979 Bolivia 20.37% 7.64% 17.00% 28.56% 1.64% 15.27% 9.51%
1981 Chile 7.89% 15.91% 11.42% 33.35% 4.61% 18.39% 8.43%
1982 Bolivia 22.84% 5.77% 18.24% 24.40% 2.12% 15.84% 10.79%
1982 Chile 9.15% 14.21% 14.21% 30.81% 5.39% 17.49% 8.74%
1982 Taiwan 9.58% 7.52% 2.80% 46.35% 2.83% 22.50% 8.42%
1983 Phillippines 26.98% 13.10% 1.72% 32.42% 2.94% 16.74% 6.09%
1983 Chile 9.12% 12.40% 14.18% 32.35% 5.72% 17.62% 8.62%
1985 Malaysia 25.52% 6.53% 16.81% 23.15% 3.20% 16.50% 8.29%
1988 Bolivia 24.22% 4.60% 13.51% 24.36% 2.34% 17.64% 13.34%
1989 Argentina 10.09% 9.53% 2.63% 33.50% 3.30% 28.63% 12.32%
1992 Sweden 6.24% 10.29% 0.70% 37.21% 6.63% 22.89% 16.04%
1997 Indonesia 17.24% 9.49% 13.60% 32.18% 0.56% 21.19% 5.75%
2000 Argentina 9.83% 9.37% 3.20% 28.76% 4.80% 28.61% 15.43%27 
Table 8: Estimated cumulative effect of financial contractions on total non-financial sector value added 
growth. 
 
Notes: Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in 
each country (identified according to Clemente, Montanes, Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root 
test) followed by negative growth rate. The partial cumulative effect of financial contraction on real economy total is 
calculated as the sum of cumulative effects in individual sectors weighted by each sector’s value added shares (see 
Table 10).
Year Country Fin. Cont.
Size Dummy effect onlyProportional to size
1973 India -10.02% -3.31% -2.32%
1975 Sweden -0.59% -4.29% -0.18%
1979 Bolivia -1.15% -3.36% -0.27%
1981 Chile -7.16% -4.47% -2.23%
1982 Bolivia -18.64% -3.06% -3.98%
1982 Chile -83.53% -4.15% -24.19%
1982 Taiwan -1.73% -3.97% -0.48%
1983 Phillippines -21.59% -4.34% -6.54%
1983 Chile -20.73% -3.96% -5.72%
1985 Malaysia -1.86% -3.12% -0.41%
1988 Bolivia -1.97% -3.07% -0.42%
1989 Argentina -5.48% -4.10% -1.57%
1992 Sweden -2.82% -4.19% -0.82%
1997 Indonesia -28.37% -3.75% -7.42%
2000 Argentina -9.34% -3.99% -2.60%
Comulative imact28 
 
Table 9: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial contractions on sectoral real value added growth rates; controlling for 
financial openness and reserve accumulation. 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. 
Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to 
Clemente, Montanes, Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent var.: value added growth rate agriculture construction mining manufacturing public utilities wholesale, retail transportation
Lag financial contraction -0.023 -0.007 0.016 -0.010 0.027 0.059* 0.051*
(0.041) (0.072) (0.073) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.030)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness -0.015 -0.205*** -0.073 -0.088** -0.033 -0.084** -0.147***
(0.038) (0.066) (0.067) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.027)
Lag (reserves/gdp) 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp) 0.001 0.015* 0.008 0.010** 0.000 0.001 0.010***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 813 813 813 813 813 813 813
R-squared 0.099 0.169 0.092 0.184 0.122 0.138 0.194
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Lag financial contraction -0.036 -0.056 -0.020 -0.053 0.067 -0.023 0.079*
(0.071) (0.118) (0.118) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055) (0.043)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness 0.003 -0.233*** -0.065 -0.105*** -0.057 -0.131*** -0.156***
(0.046) (0.077) (0.077) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.028)
Lag (reserves/gdp) 0.001** 0.002** -0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp) -0.003 0.028** 0.012 0.019*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.009*
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 590 590 590 590 590 590 590
R-squared 0.115 0.176 0.097 0.199 0.122 0.207 0.257
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Baseline
Additional controls29 
Table 10: Contraction episodes in financial sector growth rates 
 
Notes: Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified 
according to Clemente, Montanes, Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate. 
Year Country Contraction Sudden Stop Source:
1951 United Kingdom 0.00%
1956 Colombia -13.54%





1981 Chile -7.16% Yes Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
1982 Bolivia -18.64% No
1982 Chile -83.53% Yes Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
1982 Taiwan -1.73% No
1983 Phillippines -21.59% Yes Hutchison and Noy (2006)
1983 Chile -20.73% Yes Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
1985 Malaysia -1.86% Yes Hutchison and Noy (2006)
1988 Bolivia -1.97% No
1989 Argentina -5.48% Yes (1991) Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
1992 Sweden -2.82% Yes Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia (2004)
1997 Indonesia -28.37% Yes Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia (2004)
2000 Argentina -9.34% Yes Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia (2004)
Most countries in the sample, except for 
U.K. and Sweden, closed to private capital 
flows in the pre-1980 period.30 
Table 11: Panel regressions of the effect of LARGE sharp financial contractions (above the median in absolute value) on sectoral 
real value added growth rates; controlling for financial openness and reserve accumulation. 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. 
Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to 
Clemente, Montanes, Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by a 9.34 percent (sample median) or greater 
contraction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dependent var.: value added growth rate agriculture construction government mining manufacturing public utilities wholesale, retail transportation
Lag financial contraction -0.016 -0.050 -0.029 -0.002 -0.036 -0.005 -0.025 0.050
(0.054) (0.095) (0.086) (0.097) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.039)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness 0.093 -0.503*** -0.106 -0.021 -0.201*** -0.012 -0.342*** -0.218***
(0.063) (0.111) (0.100) (0.113) (0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.046)
Lag (reserves/gdp) 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp) -0.030** 0.085*** 0.012 -0.002 0.037*** -0.001 0.070*** 0.025***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 813 813 755 813 813 813 813 813
R-squared 0.110 0.176 0.024 0.091 0.193 0.122 0.173 0.194
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Lag financial contraction -0.132 0.218 0.088 -0.001 0.061 0.113 0.168** 0.199***
(0.112) (0.187) (0.192) (0.188) (0.094) (0.096) (0.085) (0.069)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness 0.182* -0.656*** -0.207 -0.056 -0.264*** -0.087 -0.455*** -0.289***
(0.094) (0.156) (0.161) (0.157) (0.079) (0.079) (0.071) (0.058)
Lag (reserves/gdp) 0.001** 0.002** -0.000 -0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp) -0.037*** 0.083*** 0.019 0.008 0.038*** 0.001 0.070*** 0.021**
(0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 590 590 578 590 590 590 590 590
R-squared 0.131 0.190 0.031 0.096 0.208 0.121 0.252 0.265







Figure 1: Argentina SAMPLE – Financial sector value added to GDP ratio (top panel); structural breaks 
in the growth rate (center panel), and cyclical components of financial sector and non-financial sectors 
total value added (bottom panel). 32 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Country-level granger-causality regressions between the cyclical component of financial sector value added 
and the non-financial sector. Top panel in levels; bottom panel in first differences. 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cyclical component identified using the band-pass filter suggested by 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure 
we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years 
Country ARG BOL BRA CHL COL CRI DEU DNK ESP FRA GBR HKG IDN IND
Lag CF(Fin. Value added) -0.137***-0.051*** 0.075 0.039 0.018 0.094*** 0.105 -0.189***-0.198*** 0.038 0.050 0.106*** -0.088** -0.671***
(0.046) (0.018) (0.078) (0.031) (0.033) (0.018) (0.192) (0.056) (0.067) (0.063) (0.091) (0.031) (0.037) (0.166)
Lag CF(Non-fin. Value added) 0.888*** 0.900*** 0.719*** 0.712*** 0.811***0.617***0.526***0.656*** 0.990*** 0.473*** 0.489*** 0.345** 0.919*** 2.685***
(0.098) (0.067) (0.088) (0.114) (0.109) (0.100) (0.121) (0.063) (0.077) (0.070) (0.073) (0.143) (0.145) (0.616)
Constant -0.006 -0.004 -0.007* -0.009 -0.007* -0.008* 0.253***0.222*** 0.076***-0.012***0.209***-0.524*** 0.008 0.023
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.058) (0.030) (0.020) (0.002) (0.034) (0.123) (0.008) (0.014)
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 41 58 58 55 58 31 45 55
R-squared 0.637 0.726 0.639 0.571 0.667 0.605 0.579 0.648 0.766 0.489 0.530 0.269 0.413 0.330
Country ITA JPN KOR MEX MYS NLD PER PHL SGP SWE THA TWN USA VEN
Lag CF(Fin. Value added) 0.139 0.016 -0.163 -0.323*** -0.126 0.067 0.016 -0.158* -0.271***-0.281** -0.042 -0.059**-0.899*** 0.086*
(0.100) (0.032) (0.111) (0.058) (0.091) (0.051) (0.158) (0.085) (0.060) (0.134) (0.030) (0.023) (0.171) (0.044)
Lag CF(Non-fin. Value added) 0.494*** 0.652*** 0.809*** 0.951*** 0.876***0.517***0.713***1.018*** 1.031*** 0.703*** 0.928*** 0.641***0.943*** 0.697***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.094) (0.081) (0.144) (0.072) (0.206) (0.166) (0.074) (0.070) (0.097) (0.114) (0.093) (0.085)
Constant -0.009***-0.157***-0.218***-0.008*** -0.009 0.015*** -0.006 -0.005 0.006* -0.014*** -0.002 0.015***0.442*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.034) (0.056) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.060) (0.005)
Observations 54 51 52 55 35 45 55 34 45 55 54 44 58 55
R-squared 0.437 0.619 0.559 0.738 0.643 0.568 0.535 0.648 0.768 0.695 0.698 0.441 0.628 0.633
Country ARG BOL BRA CHL COL CRI DEU DNK ESP FRA GBR HKG IDN IND
Lag Change in CF(Fin. Value added) -0.170** -0.104*** 0.240** -0.011 0.005 0.088*** 0.181 -0.039 -0.188*** -0.019 -0.090 0.105* -0.045 -0.184
(0.080) (0.024) (0.094) (0.032) (0.036) (0.020) (0.217) (0.064) (0.069) (0.084) (0.121) (0.057) (0.048) (0.134)
Lag Change in CF(Non-fin. Value added) 0.710*** 0.755*** 0.583*** 0.711*** 0.767***0.471*** 0.319** 0.477*** 0.886*** 0.406*** 0.386*** 0.248 0.534** 1.278***
(0.131) (0.088) (0.100) (0.141) (0.125) (0.117) (0.120) (0.070) (0.107) (0.083) (0.080) (0.162) (0.259) (0.436)
Constant 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 40 57 57 54 57 30 44 54
R-squared 0.376 0.521 0.518 0.441 0.516 0.363 0.246 0.402 0.519 0.291 0.290 0.138 0.123 0.101
Durbin-Watson 1.274 0.878 0.628 0.796 0.693 0.974 1.387 0.944 1.073 1.196 1.082 1.289 1.032 1.010
Country ITA JPN KOR MEX MYS NLD PER PHL SGP SWE THA TWN USA VEN
Lag Change in CF(Fin. Value added) 0.268** 0.071** -0.019 -0.340*** -0.158* -0.004 -0.002 -0.307** -0.221** -0.394***-0.081***-0.081**-0.855*** 0.040
(0.100) (0.027) (0.192) (0.058) (0.084) (0.038) (0.159) (0.134) (0.082) (0.127) (0.030) (0.031) (0.154) (0.047)
Lag Change in CF(Non-fin. Value added) 0.400*** 0.528*** 0.426*** 0.800*** 0.697***0.450***0.626***1.224*** 0.747*** 0.510*** 0.842*** 0.480***0.722*** 0.508***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.143) (0.103) (0.145) (0.084) (0.198) (0.295) (0.085) (0.089) (0.130) (0.124) (0.099) (0.137)
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 53 50 51 54 34 44 54 33 44 54 53 43 57 54
R-squared 0.370 0.474 0.178 0.539 0.424 0.409 0.395 0.517 0.537 0.427 0.503 0.298 0.437 0.270
Durbin-Watson 0.858 0.932 1.322 1.093 1.122 0.854 0.916 0.830 1.052 1.138 0.945 0.935 1.201 1.14333 
Table A2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 
Notes: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using 
an asymptotic Chi -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 1388 total number of 
observations with 28 cross-sections. The number of augmenting lags (p) is determined by minimizing the Schwartz 
Bayesian information criterion. Exogenous variables: Individual effects. The p-values indicate that the null of unit 
root is strongly rejected, indicating that the financial sector growth series is stationary.
Method Statistic Prob.**
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 1010.22 0.0000
ADF - Choi Z-stat -28.7669 0.000034 
Table A3: Intermediate ADF test results 
 
Notes: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). The number of augmenting lags (p) is determined 
by minimizing the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion. Exogenous variables: Individual effects. The p-values 
















Cross section Prob. Lag   Max Lag Obs
Argentina 0.000 0 10 54
Bolivia 0.000 0 10 54
Brazil 0.000 0 10 54
Chile 0.000 0 10 54
Colombia 0.000 0 10 54
Costa Rica 0.000 0 10 54
D e n m a r k 0 . 0 0 029 3 8
France 0.000 1 10 56
Germany 0.000 0 10 57
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.000 0 10 54
India 0.000 0 10 57
Indonesia 0.001 0 6 30
I t a l y 0 . 0 0 009 4 4
Japan 0.000 1 10 53
Korea, Rep. 0.000 0 10 53
Malaysia 0.000 0 10 50
Mexico 0.000 0 10 51
Netherlands 0.000 0 10 54
Peru 0.000 0 8 34
Philippines 0.000 0 9 44
Singapore 0.000 0 10 54
S p a i n 0 . 0 0 107 3 3
Sweden 0.005 0 9 44
Taiwan 0.000 1 10 53
Thailand 0.000 1 10 52
United Kingdom 0.000 0 9 43
United States 0.000 1 10 56
Venezuela, RB 0.000 0 10 5434 
Table A4: Additional controls: the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – structural 
breaks – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors. 
   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Financial contractions (expansions) defined 
as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to 
Clemente, Motanes, Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative (positive) 
growth rate. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent var.: value added growth rate agriculture construction mining manufacturing public utilities wholesale, retail transportation
lag financial contraction -0.056*** -0.118*** -0.023 -0.037* -0.007 -0.016 -0.046***
(0.021) (0.040) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014)
lag financial expansion -0.010 0.013 -0.016 0.015 0.005 0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.026) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
convergence (value added per worker) -0.032** -0.020 -0.054*** -0.023 -0.031*** -0.073*** -0.090***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
banking crisis -0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.013 -0.040*** -0.005 0.011
(0.016) (0.030) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
currency crisis -0.001 -0.048** -0.006 -0.019* -0.025** -0.009 -0.012*
(0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
log(gdp/cap) 1.720* 4.089** -1.982 -0.086 -0.101 3.771*** 3.067***
(0.935) (1.760) (1.609) (0.956) (0.846) (0.834) (0.658)
wdi_credit -0.008 -0.059** 0.046* -0.016 0.004 -0.031*** -0.010
(0.013) (0.024) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
log(inflation) -0.709** -1.063* -0.599 -1.515*** -0.203 -1.231*** -0.566***
(0.307) (0.581) (0.563) (0.283) (0.279) (0.263) (0.205)
log(govt spending) -1.112 -0.976 -6.881 -3.130 -1.471 -0.404 -5.062***
(2.335) (4.386) (4.358) (2.156) (2.133) (2.012) (1.556)
de-facto financial openness 0.125 -1.652 1.753 -1.385 -0.546 -3.029** -1.641
(1.544) (2.852) (2.808) (1.441) (1.394) (1.361) (1.021)
log(trade openness) 0.205 0.954 5.169 5.677*** 0.701 -0.404 3.456***
lagged value added growth: (1.927) (3.465) (3.419) (1.712) (1.685) (1.610) (1.241)
agriculature -0.277*** -0.038 -0.027 -0.022 0.032 0.032 -0.028
(0.044) (0.082) (0.080) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.029)
construction 0.014 0.158*** 0.033 -0.010 0.029 -0.015 0.022
(0.027) (0.053) (0.051) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.018)
government 0.006 0.029 -0.007 -0.009 0.002 0.002 0.014
(0.024) (0.045) (0.044) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016)
mining -0.006 -0.023 0.067 -0.019 0.018 -0.016 -0.026*
(0.024) (0.045) (0.045) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016)
manufacturing 0.122* 0.142 -0.048 0.166*** -0.011 0.154*** 0.159***
(0.066) (0.124) (0.122) (0.061) (0.060) (0.057) (0.044)
public utilities -0.038 0.195** -0.056 0.053 -0.080* 0.058 0.009
(0.049) (0.092) (0.090) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.033)
transportation -0.039 0.036 -0.400*** -0.241*** -0.034 -0.143** -0.078
(0.074) (0.139) (0.136) (0.068) (0.067) (0.064) (0.050)
wholesale, retail -0.026 0.078 0.119 0.067 0.071 0.028 0.031
(0.074) (0.141) (0.137) (0.069) (0.068) (0.064) (0.050)
real interest rate -0.025 0.004 0.082* -0.006 0.007 -0.014 -0.019
(0.024) (0.045) (0.044) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016)
agricultural share of economy 0.277* 0.573** 0.113 0.412*** 0.221* 0.318** 0.089
(0.144) (0.280) (0.264) (0.132) (0.130) (0.124) (0.096)
industry share of economy 0.184* 0.297 0.244 0.212** -0.028 0.138 -0.027
(0.098) (0.186) (0.185) (0.090) (0.089) (0.084) (0.065)
political stability -1.342 -2.629 0.187 -2.335 -0.066 1.226 2.100*
(1.746) (3.292) (3.226) (1.622) (1.592) (1.528) (1.168)
rule of law 0.411 3.999 4.953 5.434** 2.206 -1.415 -3.887*
(2.965) (5.419) (5.282) (2.733) (2.628) (2.560) (1.991)
regulatory quality 0.141 2.000 -1.099 0.552 1.050 2.972** 1.745*
(1.401) (2.551) (2.474) (1.323) (1.233) (1.316) (0.960)
Constant -0.064 -0.384 0.304 -0.091 0.207 -0.001 0.211**
(0.141) (0.267) (0.259) (0.131) (0.129) (0.126) (0.096)
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551 551
R-squared 0.116 0.166 0.120 0.194 0.129 0.203 0.266
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes36 
Table A5: Additional controls; the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – turning 
points in the cyclical component – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors. 
   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cyclical component identified using the 
band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant 
(1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it 
range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent var.: value added growth rate agriculture construction mining manufacturing public utilities wholesale, retail transportation
lag financial contraction 0.005 -0.026** -0.030** -0.013** -0.004 -0.018*** -0.010**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
lag financial expansion -0.001 0.026** -0.008 0.010 0.012* 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
convergence (value added per worker) -0.032** -0.026 -0.055*** -0.025 -0.030*** -0.072*** -0.088***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
banking crisis -0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.011 -0.040*** -0.005 0.012
(0.016) (0.030) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
currency crisis -0.004 -0.051** -0.007 -0.019* -0.025** -0.009 -0.013*
(0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
log(gdp/cap) 0.017* 0.043** -0.020 0.000 -0.001 0.037*** 0.030***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
wdi_credit -0.000 -0.001** 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(inflation) -0.008** -0.011* -0.005 -0.015*** -0.002 -0.012*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
log(govt spending) -0.012 -0.008 -0.063 -0.030 -0.015 -0.002 -0.049***
(0.024) (0.044) (0.043) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016)
de-facto financial openness -0.002 -0.024 0.014 -0.017 -0.006 -0.032** -0.019*
(0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
log(trade openness) 0.003 0.010 0.054 0.057*** 0.007 -0.003 0.035***
lagged value added growth: (0.019) (0.035) (0.034) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
agriculature -0.271*** -0.038 -0.030 -0.022 0.028 0.028 -0.027
(0.044) (0.082) (0.080) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.029)
construction 0.008 0.135** 0.028 -0.018 0.026 -0.020 0.015
(0.028) (0.053) (0.050) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018)
government 0.005 0.023 -0.012 -0.011 0.002 -0.000 0.011
(0.024) (0.045) (0.044) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016)
mining -0.008 -0.028 0.066 -0.020 0.017 -0.017 -0.028*
(0.024) (0.045) (0.045) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016)
manufacturing 0.133** 0.102 -0.059 0.147** -0.027 0.131** 0.150***
(0.067) (0.125) (0.122) (0.061) (0.060) (0.057) (0.045)
public utilities -0.036 0.229** -0.045 0.068 -0.073 0.070* 0.021
(0.049) (0.092) (0.090) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.033)
transportation -0.021 0.072 -0.388*** -0.231*** -0.034 -0.140** -0.062
(0.075) (0.138) (0.134) (0.068) (0.067) (0.062) (0.050)
wholesale, retail -0.025 0.109 0.127 0.079 0.078 0.040 0.040
(0.075) (0.141) (0.136) (0.069) (0.068) (0.064) (0.050)
real interest rate -0.000 0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
agricultural share of economy 0.003* 0.006** 0.001 0.004*** 0.002 0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
industry share of economy 0.002* 0.003 0.002 0.002** -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
political stability -0.013 -0.024 0.006 -0.023 -0.000 0.014 0.022*
(0.018) (0.033) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
rule of law 0.006 0.037 0.044 0.052* 0.022 -0.017 -0.039*
(0.030) (0.054) (0.053) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020)
regulatory quality -0.000 0.022 -0.010 0.007 0.011 0.030** 0.017*
(0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Constant -0.053 -0.365 0.299 -0.089 0.207 -0.005 0.213**
(0.142) (0.266) (0.258) (0.131) (0.129) (0.124) (0.096)
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551 551
R-squared 0.104 0.166 0.129 0.198 0.137 0.224 0.260
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes